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Every penny counts: The effect of holistic-analytic thinking style on donation decisions in the times of Covid-19

Xiaozhou (Zoe) Zhou^a, Blanca Requero^b, Dilney Gonçalves^a, David Santos^{c,*}

^a IE Business School, IE University, Spain

^b Department of Psychology, Villanueva University, Spain

^c IE School of Human Sciences and Technology, IE University, Spain

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ABSTRACT

This research explores how individual differences in holistic-analytic thinking style affect people's donation intentions and decisions. Specifically, we find that individuals with a more holistic thinking style are more likely to make donations compared to individuals with a less holistic thinking style, and the effect is mediated by the belief that every penny counts. In the first two studies, we examine the impact of cognitive style on donation for a Covid-19-related cause. This context is important because ensuring that individual donors believe their contributions matter is crucial when raising donations for a cause that impacts a large number of beneficiaries, such as fighting Covid-19. We establish the underlying mechanism of the impact of cognitive style on donation intention and donation amount. A third study shows that our findings can be extended beyond the context of Covid-19 and generalized to other nonprofit projects. In conclusion, taking into account an individual-difference variable, such as holistic-analytic thinking style, is important to explain donation decisions and might be worth considering when designing and implementing social interventions, especially during pandemic situations like the one produced by Covid-19.

Would you be willing to donate \$5 if your donation could help a poor child so that he could go to school without an empty stomach for one day? What about donating \$5 towards a \$10,000 project that helps a family who suffered from a hurricane to rebuild their home? The answers to these questions are probably yes. Now consider being asked to donate towards a cause that affects the entire world, like Covid-19, and requires such a large amount of money that \$5 may simply be too little to help. Would you still be willing to donate \$5? Based on extant research, we expect that in this case the motivation to donate would be reduced. Specifically, past research shows that individual donors care about whether their contribution makes a difference to the cause they are supporting (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Diamond & Kashyap, 1997) and they are less likely to donate when they perceive that their contribution will not make an impact (Duncan, 2004; Gneezy, Keenan, & Gneezy, 2014). The perceived lack of efficacy by individual donors can be an obstacle for nonprofits when they are raising money for Covid-19 – an issue which requires significant fundraising for meaningful charitable activity and which has impacted a large number of people. Thus, it is important for organizations who are seeking donations to ensure that individual donors believe that every donation matters in the times of

Covid-19. The present work aims to examine one individual difference variable that can have an effect on people's donation intention and decision during Covid-19. Specifically, we explore how cognitive style (holistic or analytic; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) influenced an individual's decision to donate towards large projects; including, but not limited to, Covid-19 related projects.

Research on cognitive style has accumulated empirical evidence that demonstrates holistic-analytic thinking shapes how people think and behave across a variety of domains, such as causal attribution (Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, & Park, 2003; Miyamoto, 2013), attentional processes (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Kitayama, Park, Sevincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009), logical reasoning (Buchtel & Norenzayan, 2008; Koo & Choi, 2005), categorization (Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2012), or tolerance of contradiction (Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010). Briefly described, holistic thinkers (vs. analytic thinkers) consider the universe as interconnected, form complex causal relationships, focus attention on stimuli as 'a whole' rather than decomposing them into parts, perceive situations as dynamic and constantly changing rather than as linear progressions, and prefer to preserve harmony by seeking a middle ground between two opposing

* Corresponding author at: IE School of Human Sciences and Technology, IE University, Castellón de la Plana, 8, Madrid 28006, Spain.

E-mail address: david.santos@ie.edu (D. Santos).

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forces (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007).

Most of the research in this domain examines styles of thinking in a cross-cultural context, often comparing Western cultures (e.g., North-American individuals) with Eastern cultures (e.g., Korean or Chinese individuals). The former are characterized as more analytical and the latter as more holistic. Although the analytic-holistic theory was originally conceptualized to serve as an explanation for cultural differences, it can also be seen as an individual-difference variable – individuals might be more holistic or analytic thinkers (Choi et al., 2007). Therefore, since its conceptualization (see Nisbett et al., 2001), holistic-analytic thinking has been described as a domain-general cognitive style. Importantly, all these systematic cognitive differences between holistic versus analytic thinking style are able to explain not only cross-cultural differences (mainly between East Asians and Westerners; see Ji & Yap, 2016; Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010) but also individual variations (e.g., Choi et al., 2007; Savani, Stephens, & Markus, 2017).

Of relevance for this research, analytic and holistic thinkers differ in the way they perceive relationships between elements and infer causal links between them. Holistic thinkers focus on the context and relationships between the focal object and its context. That is, they perceive different elements to be interconnected and interdependent. As a consequence, holistic thinkers often establish stronger causal relationships between discrete entities or events (Yama & Zakaria, 2019), whereas analytic thinkers perceive different elements as independent and separated from each other, focusing on the target object without much concern for its context and the relationship with it (Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005). This encompasses comprehending a phenomenon by detaching its component objects from their context, focusing on the attributes of each component in order to assign it to categories and applying rules about these categories to explain and predict the phenomenon. This difference makes people with a holistic cognitive style (compared to analytic cognitive style) more likely to consider the interrelationships that exist in the social and physical world (Li, Masuda, Hamamura, & Ishii, 2018; Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).

As an illustration, Ji, Nisbett, and Su (2001) found that holistic thinkers were more adept at recognizing interconnections among objects and events: they estimated stronger associations between two events, were better at detecting covariation, and were more confident about their covariation judgments, compared to analytic thinkers. Furthermore, holistic thinkers were able to envision complex linkages between events occurring in different space-time variations (Ji, Guo, Zhang, & Messervey, 2009). As a result, the connection between an action (e.g., donating) and the potential subsequent consequences (e.g., benefiting people in an unfavorable situation) may be perceived more strongly by holistic thinkers.

In this sense, if people with higher holistic thinking were to perceive a stronger causal connection between events, they might be more willing to donate considering that their contribution can make an impact, even when referring to a large cause such as Covid-19 (e.g., “I want to donate because every gesture can help in the pandemic situation”). In this case, a more holistic thinking style could be an enabler for donation decision. Conversely, if people with lower holistic thinking perceive consequences of a person’s actions as more independent and separated from each other events, they might be less willing to donate because they consider that their contribution will not make a difference to improve the pandemic situation (e.g., “A single donation will not change the pandemic situation, so it is not worth it”). In this case, a less holistic thinking style could be a deterrent to donation decision. It is important to note that the present research adopts a within-culture focus to examine the effects of holistic-analytic thinking on donation, and that we use the construct as a continuum, with analytic thinking style and holistic thinking style being the two extremes.

The goal of this research is to examine the impact of holistic versus analytic cognitive style on donation. Specifically, we predict that individuals characterized by a more holistic thinking style will be more

engaged in donation compared to individuals characterized by a less holistic thinking style. Across three studies, we first examine the impact of cognitive style on donation intentions during the Covid-19 pandemic. We demonstrate that this construct influences donation above and beyond other construct like self-construal and explore the underlying mechanism of the impact of cognitive style on both donation intention and decision. Finally, we extrapolate our findings to a different context and show that our predictions still hold in a setting that is different than the Covid-19 pandemic.

1. Study 1

Study 1 aims to provide initial evidence that people who have a more holistic thinking style are more likely to donate to nonprofits for a Covid-19 cause. Previous literature has shown that donation decision (and other prosocial behaviors) may be influenced by the individual’s self-construal (Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Winterich & Barone, 2011). Evidence suggests that individuals with interdependent self-construal had a more favorable attitude towards nonprofits’ advertisement and were more likely to help (Burton, Gore, & Sturgeon, 2012), and to donate (Simpson, White, & Laran, 2018). Thus, we controlled for participants’ self-construal in this study to examine the effect of the cognitive style on donation in isolation. It is important to note that literature has shown mixed results with respect to the relationship between self-construal and cognitive style. That is, in some cases it has shown the closeness between holistic-analytic thinking style and self-construal (Choi et al., 2007; Krishna, Zhou, & Zhang, 2008; Kühnen et al., 2001) while in other cases the relationship has been null (Marquez & Ellwanger, 2014; Na et al., 2020). All data, materials and code for the three studies can be found at https://osf.io/bxnf7/?view_only=73865847d58e40cc87890aa38f4873d3.

1.1. Participants and procedure

Three hundred and twenty-five participants took part in this study via MTurk (56.35% male; $M_{age} = 38.92$, $SD = 12.94$) in exchange for a small monetary compensation (\$0.50 per participant). Two participants who did not provide complete information were removed for data analysis. Sensitivity analysis shows that this provided 80% power ($\alpha = 0.05$) to detect a relatively small effect (Cohen’s $f = 0.14$; Faul, Buchner, Erdfelder, & Mayr, 2007). Participants’ location was restricted to the United States and Canada. All participants were first asked to evaluate their donation intention to the CDC Foundation, an independent nonprofit organization established by the U.S. Congress, which is currently raising money to fight Covid-19. Donation intention was measured by having participants rate how likely they were to donate to the CDC Foundation on a seven-point scale (1 = “extremely unlikely” and 7 = “extremely likely”; Farley & Stasson, 2003). Then we measured their thinking style and self-construal with existing scales. Demographic information was collected at the end of the study.

Thinking style was measured by the Analysis-Holism Scale (AHS) developed by Choi et al. (2007). The AHS consists of 24 Likert-type items that examine systematic cognitive differences between individuals within the same culture. Each item was rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 to 7 (1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree”). We averaged each participants’ ratings across the 24 scale items (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.72$). Higher numbers indicate participants have a more holistic thinking style. Participants also completed Singelis’ scale (Singelis, 1994) for self-construal measurement. The scale includes two sets of 12 items that measure chronic independent (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.81$) and dependent (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.84$) self-construal. Participants indicated their agreement with each of the items on a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Following the instructions of Escalas and Bettman (2005), a self-construal index was constructed ((interdependent – independent)/(interdependent + independent)) so that a higher number in the index

represented higher interdependence.

1.2. Results and discussion

Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and correlations among variables. Participants indicated a quite neutral willingness towards donating to the CDC Foundation with the mean of donation likelihood being 4.1 (SD = 2.07). A regression with donation likelihood as the dependent variable and AHS as the predictor variable showed that AHS was positively associated with donation likelihood (β = 0.68, t(321) = 3.19, p = .002, 95% CI [0.26, 1.10]). Participants who have a more holistic thinking style indicated that they were more likely to make donations to the CDC Foundation for Covid-19 purposes.

Correlational analysis revealed a non-significant correlation between participants' self-reported holistic-analytic thinking style and self-construal (r = 0.07, p = .23). When we added self-construal as a control variable, the AHS remained significant (β = 0.64, t(320) = 3.02, p = .003, 95% CI [0.22, 1.05]). In addition, there was a significant main effect of self-construal on donation likelihood (β = 2.85, t(320) = 2.89, p = .004, 95% CI [0.91, 4.80]).

This is the first demonstration that cognitive style can influence donation intention. Specifically, we found that participants who reported a higher holistic thinking style were more willing to donate to nonprofits for a Covid-19 cause, compared to those who reported a lower holistic thinking style. Importantly, this effect was maintained even when we added self-construal as a control variable, indicating that self-construal cannot account for our results. An open question worth examining is whether the effect would hold when people are making decisions about how much to donate. Therefore, in the following study we tested the effect of cognitive thinking style on an incentive-compatible donation decision for a Covid-19 cause. In addition, we examined the explanatory mechanism underlying the effect.

2. Study 2

Study 2 had three main objectives. First, we sought stronger evidence that holistic-analytic thinking style had an influence on donation by using an incentive-compatible decision. In this study, participants were told that they could receive a bonus for participating in the study, then indicated their decision to donate the bonus to a nonprofit with a Covid-19 cause. They indicated their decision to donate knowing that if they were among the winners of the bonus, the amount indicated would actually be donated and deducted from their bonus. Thus, participants were incentivized to provide truthful answers (Wertenbroch & Skiera, 2002). Another objective was to test the mechanism that drove the difference in donation amount between individuals scoring higher in holistic thinking and those scoring lower. We expected that those scoring higher in holistic thinking would show greater belief that "every penny counts" when they made decisions about whether to make donations. That is, since individuals scoring higher in holistic thinking perceive that their individual actions in a context can lead to significant impact in other interconnected elements, we expected they would donate more compared to those scoring lower in holistic thinking. Consequently, we hypothesized that the belief that each donation matters would mediate the effect of cognitive style on donation. The last objective was to replicate our findings in Study 1 with a different nonprofit organization. In this study, participants were asked to donate

Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for Study 1.

	M	SD	1	2	3
1. Holistic-analytic thinking style	4.77	0.53	1.00		
2. Donation Intention	4.10	2.07	0.18*	1.00	
3. Self-construal index	-0.03	0.11	0.07	0.17*	1.00

* p < .01.

to Feeding America, the second largest U.S. charity, to help people who are affected by Covid-19.

2.1. Participants and procedure

We used the effect size of study 1 (Cohen's f = 0.17) to calculate the desired sample in study 2. G*Power revealed that the desired sample was 259 with a power of 0.8. We recruited two hundred and sixty six participants (46.24% male, M_{age} = 36.72, SD = 13.78) who live in the United States and Canada via MTurk for study 2 and each participant was paid \$0.25 to participate.

As a cover story, participants first finished a filler task that requested them to share some of their personal experiences. The following instructions were shown to participants after their filler tasks were completed: "Thanks for providing your personal stories. In order to show our appreciation, we will randomly draw 10 participants and give each a bonus of \$5. If you receive the bonus payment, we'd like to know whether you will be willing to donate part of your bonus to Feeding America, a nationwide network of 200 food banks that leads the fight against hunger in the United States. Feeding America recently launched a Covid-19 Response Fund to help people during the pandemic. If you choose to make a donation, we will donate on your behalf and email you a receipt within 10 days." We also attached a screenshot of Feeding America's website and link in case the participants wanted to learn more about the nonprofit or their Covid-19 Response Fund (Appendix 1). Participants were asked to indicate their donation amount. Next, they reported their agreement with statements that intended to assess the mediators. Finally, we measured their thinking style and collected the demographic information.

Participants' donation amount was measured by having them indicate what percentage of bonus they would be willing to donate on a scale ranging from 0% to 100%. This measure of donation decision has been used in previous research (Simpson et al., 2018). In order to measure participants' opinion towards whether every penny of donation matters (the mediator), they indicated their agreement level (1 = "strongly disagree", and 7 = "strongly agree") on the following 5 items: 1) "I want to donate to Feeding America because I believe every penny counts"; 2) "I want to donate to Feeding America because I believe my donation can make a difference"; 3) "I do not want to donate to Feeding America because the amount is too small to be helpful"; 4) "I do not want to donate to Feeding America because I believe my donation will not make a difference"; 5) "I want to donate to Feeding America because I believe that even a small contribution can lead to a change." Item 3 and 4 were reverse-coded. We created an index by averaging the five items (Cronbach's α = 0.87). As in Study 1, the holistic-analytic thinking style was measured by the AHS (α = 0.70; Choi et al., 2007).

After the data collection was completed, we randomly selected 10 participants. A cash donation to Feeding America was made based on the amount the participants indicated in the study and the rest was paid to the participants in the form of bonus payment on MTurk.

2.2. Results and discussion

Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Participants, on average, were willing to donate 33.04% (SD = 32.24%) of their bonus (roughly \$1.65) to the Covid-19 Response Fund.

Table 2
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for Study 2.

	M	SD	1	2	3
1. Holistic-analytic thinking style	4.80	0.51	1.00		
2. Donation amount	33.04	32.24	0.09	1.00	
3. Beliefs about donation contribution (mediator index)	5.02	1.55	0.17*	0.50*	1.00

* p < .01.

Mediation was tested by using Model 4 of Hayes' PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes, 2013) with bootstrapping of 10,000 samples. The relationship between AHS (the predictor variable) and the mediator index was positive and significant ($\beta = 0.50, t(264) = 2.72, p = .007, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.14, 0.87]$). As participants' thinking style became more holistic, they indicated higher agreement that their individual donations mattered and could make a difference. The mediator index was positively and significantly related to the donation amount ($\beta = 10.40, t(263) = 9.24, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [8.18, 12.61]$). That is, those who agreed that their individual donation can be helpful decided to donate more than those who did not agree. The overall mediation was also significant (indirect effect $a \times b = 5.23, SE = 2.08; 95\% \text{ CI } [1.25, 9.45]; \text{ Fig. 1}$).

Therefore, Study 2 replicated and extended the pattern of results found in the previous study, but this time using an incentive-compatible donation decision measure as the dependent variable. That is, individuals with a more holistic thinking style decided to donate more compared to those with a less holistic thinking style. More importantly, this effect was mediated by the belief that their individual donations could be helpful and could make a difference in the cause they were supporting, in this case, the Covid-19 Response Fund. To test whether this effect can be generalized to other donation decisions beyond the cause of Covid-19, in the next study we examine the impact of cognitive style on another more common social cause, fighting hunger.

3. Study 3

Because of its local impact to various nations and also its worldwide impact, Covid-19 is a unique situation where the extent of its direct and indirect consequences can be relatively close to each individual. Furthermore, in these circumstances, the media reports daily on the state of the pandemic, which causes people to keep the alarming situation actively in mind. In study 3, we showed that the influence of holistic-analytic thinking style on donation can extend to other charitable projects that are also large, but that do not have the same media alarm as Covid-19 (and therefore are less salient in people's minds).

3.1. Participants and procedure

The desired sample size of 398 was determined by using G*Power with power of 0.8 and effect size of Cohen's $f = 0.14$. The effect size was calculated by averaging the effect size of study 1 and study 2. Four hundred and six participants (36.95% male; $M_{\text{age}} = 38.98, SD = 13.36$) joined this study via MTurk and they were paid \$0.10 each. Two participants were removed as they provided incomplete answers. Participants were shown an advertisement from Feeding America that intends to encourage donation to fight hunger in the United States. The ad states: "Even in the world's greatest food-producing nation, children and adults face poverty and hunger in every county across America. 40 million people struggle with hunger in the United States, including more than 12 million children. At Feeding America, we rely on donations to help make food available to families struggling with hunger, and we can't do this work without you." The content of the ad was taken from the official website of Feeding America and we made some modifications to fit our




Fig. 1. Mediation model for Study 2.

study. Participants answered the questions that measured their donation likelihood, cognitive style, and demographics.

Donation likelihood was measured on the same seven-point scale (1 = "extremely unlikely" and 7 = "extremely likely") as in Study 1 and we used the AHS ($\alpha = 0.77; \text{ Choi et al., 2007}$) to capture their thinking style as in Studies 1 and 2.

3.2. Results and discussion

Descriptive statistics correlation matrix is reported in Table 3. We ran a regression with donation likelihood as the dependent variable and AHS as the predictor variable to examine whether those scoring higher in holistic thinking (vs. lower) indicated greater donation likelihood towards Feeding America's project to fight hunger in America. AHS was positively and significantly related to participants' donation likelihood ($\beta = 0.60, t(402) = 4.16, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.32, 0.88]$). That is, individuals with a more holistic thinking style reported that they were more likely to make donations.

This final study tested the effect of cognitive thinking style on intentions to donate to another cause, that is, a fund to fight hunger. Those who reported higher holistic thinking were more willing to donate compared to those who reported lower holistic thinking. These results show that the effect can be generalized from Covid-19 cause to other more general social issues.

4. General discussion

Our results showed that individuals' cognitive style could influence their donation decisions, especially for a cause with a large scope, such as Covid-19. In the first two studies, we obtained evidence that individuals with a more holistic thinking style, compared to those with a less holistic thinking style, were more likely to want to make donations to a Covid-19 related cause, while ruling out potential alternative accounts based on self-construal. We also provided support to our proposed mediating role of the "every penny counts" mentality. Those with a more holistic thinking style wanted to donate more to a Covid-19 related charitable cause and had greater belief that their contribution could make a difference. Study 3 replicated the findings of the influence of cognitive style on donation for a project with a cause that is more common to encounter in general.

This research contributes both to the literature on cognitive style and to that on donation. Previous research shows that holistic thinkers had a more inter-connected mindset (Ji et al., 2001; Nisbett & Masuda, 2003) and that they perceive stronger causal relationships between different elements (Ji et al., 2009). Considering these characteristics, we proposed that those with a higher holistic thinking perceive that even a small action in one context can lead to have an impact in another, and we applied this idea to donation intentions and decisions. No prior study has focused on this effect so we tested it and used an issue of global relevance such as Covid-19.

Although big efforts are being made to understand the effects of Covid-19 on pro-social behavior, Covid-19 research in psychology is still limited. Scholars in medical research have examined the effect of Covid-19 on blood and organ donations. For example, Haw, Holloway, Masser, Merz, and Thorpe (2020) discussed blood donation's role to potentially mitigate the negative effect of stay-at-home measures, which was taken by many governments as a way to slow the spread of Covid-19. They suggest that the altruistic act of donation could help donors restore a

Table 3
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for Study 3.

	M	SD	1	2
1. Holistic-analytic thinking style	4.79	0.58	1.00	
2. Donation intention	4.77	1.72	0.20*	1.00

* $p < .01$.

sense of self and reconnect with the community. Research in information systems focused on how social media was used as an exchange for Covid-19 information. For example, Li et al. (2020) characterized the propagation of situation information (including donations of money, goods, and services) on Chinese social media and identified that using hashtags is one of the successful publishing strategies for donation-related posts. Nonetheless, until now, research in psychology, marketing, and other related areas of social sciences has not examined the effect of Covid-19 on monetary donations. Our research contributes to these streams of literature by focusing on the influence of Covid-19 on donation behaviors and by providing an individual-difference variable that is important to consider when examining those donation decisions for Covid-19 response.

Recently, a number of studies have focused on how perceived impact and efficacy influence consumers' donation decision (Bendapudi, Singh, & Bendapudi, 1996; Bowman, 2006; Cryder, Loewenstein, & Scheines, 2013; Gneezy et al., 2014; Sharma & Morwitz, 2016). The present research, which demonstrates that cognitive style can influence the perception of efficacy and impact, provides a new important factor that can potentially influence effects with similar mechanisms. The findings that people are more likely to make a donation when they believe their contribution can make a bigger impact were linked to the identified victim effect (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997), a phenomenon that was widely tested and supported in donation-related literature. The identified victim effect suggests that people are more willing to give money to a single identified victim than a group of victims (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b). The studies of Sharma and Morwitz (2016) found that enhanced efficacy perception could increase giving to multiple beneficiaries. Future research can examine whether holistic thinkers, or people who are primed with higher holistic thinking style, are more likely to help multiple victims. Overhead aversion, a finding that donors dislike their donation being used to cover overhead costs such as salaries or fundraising, was also linked to donors' perceived efficacy (Gneezy et al., 2014). Few studies explored methods to minimize donor's overhead aversion. Two recent attempts include educating donors about the importance of the overhead expenses (Keenan & Gneezy, 2016) and using the money that was donated in exchange for material benefits such as tax breaks to cover overhead expenses (Bluvstein, Goor, Morwitz, &

Barasch, 2019). Our research suggests that encouraging donors to think holistically can potentially be another solution for donors' aversion to donating to overhead expenses.

This research also provides important practical implications for nonprofits who are raising money for Covid-19 causes currently or for other projects that can be too big or intimidating for individual donors. We suggest that making donors believe their individual donations can make a difference is effective at increasing individuals' donation intention and donation amount. Nonprofits can increase donations by stressing the belief that every donation counts and take measures to increase individual donors' perceived efficacy. However, we acknowledge that the correlational nature of our design does not provide strong evidence for causal mediation (Kline, 2015). Thus, future research should manipulate cognitive style and the associated beliefs to draw causal conclusions on the effect of holistic-analytic thinking on donation and help practitioners to design social marketing campaigns for increasing awareness on making every penny count. Although speculative, priming with a holistic mindset might lead to the perception that every penny counts and, therefore, to donate more. Similarly, tailoring social marketing campaigns to holistic thinkers (or to those with a more holistic thinking) might mention the interconnectedness of the elements in the donation process. For analytic thinkers (or those with a more analytic thinking), ads about the direct translation of the donation into something real might be more effective. Overall, cognitive style (holistic or analytic) is a factor that affects the intentions and decisions of donating and it is worth taking it into account when designing and implementing social interventions, especially during pandemic situations like the one produced by Covid-19.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Xiaozhou (Zoe) Zhou: Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Methodology. **Blanca Requero:** Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Methodology. **Dilney Gonçalves:** Funding acquisition, Resources, Writing – review & editing. **David Santos:** Conceptualization, Project administration, Writing – review & editing, Supervision.

Appendix I


Thanks for providing your personal stories.

In order to show our appreciation, we will randomly draw 10 participants and give each a bonus of \$5.

If you receive the bonus payment, we'd like to know whether you will be willing to donate part of your bonus to Feeding America, a nationwide network of 200 food banks that leads the fight against hunger in the United States. Feeding America recently launched a COVID-19 Response Fund to help people during the pandemic. **If you choose to make a donation, we will donate on your behalf and email you a receipt within 10 days.**

You can visit their website if you are interested in knowing more about Feeding America and their COVID-19 Response Fund.

https://www.feedingamerica.org/take-action/coronavirus?s_onsite_promo=lightbox



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